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Econometric models with nonlinear budgets sets frequently arise in the study of impact of 
taxation on labor supply.  Blomquist and Newey (2002) have suggested a nonparametric method 
to estimate the uncompensated wage and income effects when the budget set is nonlinear.  This 
paper extends their nonparametric estimation method to censored dependent variables.  The 
modified method is applied to estimate female wage and income elasticities using the 1985 and 
1989 waves of PSID exploiting the drastic change in the complete budget set caused by TRA 
1986 as a source of identification.  I find evidence of downward bias in estimated elasticities if 
the nonlinearity in the budget set is ignored.  The estimated wage elasticities range from 0.6-0.74 
for total hours and from 0.26-0.29 on the intensive margin. The income elasticity estimates range 
from -0.4 to -0.67 overall and from -0.12 to -0.15 on the intensive margin.   
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Nonlinear-budget-set techniques have been used widely in the analysis of tax and transfer 
policies on labor market outcomes.
1   It is well known that not accounting for the nonlinearity in 
the budget set generally leads to biased estimates of the impact of the after-tax wage on labor 
supply.  Most theoretical predictions become ambiguous when the budget set is nonlinear 
(Moffitt, 1990); in particular, comparative statics of consumer demand may not conform to usual 
textbook predictions (Moffitt, 1986).  Another source of bias in the estimated behavioral 
elasticities is the tendency for individuals to “bunch up” at such points, as location at kink points 
is consistent with a multiplicity of budget-set slopes.  These individuals will not respond to 
moderate changes in the tax rate simply because they are located at the kink points, which have 
little to do with their underlying preferences.  Failure to account for this phenomenon will tend to 
bias the wage effect downward.
2   
 In a survey paper on the econometrics of nonlinear budget constraints, Moffitt (1990) 
reviewed existing methods for dealing with kinks in the budget set.  Two of the most widely used 
estimation methods are Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) and instrumental-variable 
estimation of marginal labor supply functions.  The MLE method proposed by Burtless and 
Hausman (1978) comprehensively takes into account the entire budget set, with each segment 
and kink contributing to the likelihood function.  The budget set generated by the tax system can 
be treated as exogenous and does not require instrumenting for the endogenous after-tax price or 
slope.   While MLE provides the most efficient estimates if the distributional assumptions 
underlying the model are correct, the estimates will be inconsistent if the functional form and 
                                                           
1 For example see Burtless and Hausman (1978), Hausman (1980), Hausman (1981), Hausman (1985), Burtless and 
Moffitt (1980), Triest (1990), Friedberg (1996), MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch (1990), among others. 
2 Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998) explicitly control for such selection bias caused due to location at the kink   
points without modeling the entire budget constraint. 
  2distributional assumptions are false.  Most papers applying maximum-likelihood techniques have 
estimated a linear index function.
3   Thus, there may be two possible sources of bias in the MLE 
approach: (1) the bias due to parametric assumptions about the regression function; and, (2) the 
bias due to distributional assumption about the error term.  Limited dependent variable models 
based on normality and homoscedasticity perform very poorly if these assumptions are violated 
(Hausman, 1985; Wooldridge, 2002).  Many papers have found significant biases due to 
misspecification of the error distribution in such models (Chay and Powell, 1996; Gerfin, 1996; 
Martins, 2001). 
  Due to the complications surrounding MLE in this setting, several papers have instead 
chosen to estimate labor supply parameters using instrumental-variable methods.  To address the 
issue of the slope and virtual income at kink points, some papers use a smooth and differentiable 
approximation of the budget set and estimate the model using instrumental variables.  MaCurdy, 
Green and Paarsch (1990) have suggested combining the differentiable budget constraint 
methodology with MLE to weaken the strong restrictions imposed by MLE at kink points.  Of 
course, the instrumental variable method will produce biased results if the instruments for the 
endogenous observed after-tax wage are not valid, while it uses only local information on the 
budget set and lacks the efficiency of the MLE approach.  This method also does not allow for 
optimization error in the econometric specification of labor supply and constrains the utility-
maximizing choice to be on the observed segment.  The presence of optimization error in the 
model invalidates the assumption in the instrumental variable method, that the observed labor 
supply is indeed the utility maximizing one. Heim and Meyer (2004) show that Slutsky positivity 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
  
3 For example see Hausman (1980), Hausman (1981), Hausman (1985), Hausman and Ruud (1984),  Burtless and 
Moffitt (1980), Triest (1990), and Friedberg (1996). 
  3restrictions impose by Hausman’s MLE approach is tantamount to assuming convex preferences 
and propose a direct utility approach. 
    All of the approaches discussed above rely on either a parametric specification of the 
labor supply function or a known distribution for the stochastic specification. Blomquist and 
Newey (2002) have proposed an estimator that relaxes many of the restrictive parametric 
assumptions which form the basis of the MLE approach and that overcomes many of the 
limitations of the instrumental-variable approach.  Their estimator models the labor supply 
equation as a function of the entire budget set (i.e., all the segments and kinks).  They derive an 
expression for the expected labor supply function that effectively isolates a selection-bias-type 
term which arises due to the nonlinearity of the budget set and yields an additive specification.
4  
Their proposed method does not require any functional form assumptions for labor supply and 
can be conveniently estimated using methods that allow one to impose additivity, such as power 
series, splines or generalized additive models (Hastie and Tibishirani, 1998).  An added 
advantage of employing their approach is the convenience for testing the linearlity of the labor 
supply function or nonlinear budget sets or both, as these cases are nested within their derived 
specification for the expected labor supply function. However, Blomquist and Newey (2002) 
derived this expression assuming that the probability of not working is zero.
5     
I make the following three contributions.  First, I extend the nonparametric estimation 
method proposed by Blomquist and Newey (2002) to incorporate cases in which the dependent 
variable is censored.  The derived expression has a form that is similar to Blomquist and Newey 
                                                           
4 This selection bias type term is not due to wages that are endogenously missing. 
5 Blomquist and Newey (2002) studied male labor supply in Sweden where censoring of hours of work was not an 
issue. The only other paper that has applied this method is Wu (2003), who does it for estimating the labor supply 
effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).  This paper accounts for mild censoring in the data by estimating a 
Heckman-type selection-bias-corrected model on a subsample of workers; including an inverse mills ratio from a 
first stage probit; and relying on nonlinearity of the inverse Mills ratio for identification.   
 
  4(2002), with one additional term to be accounted for in estimation, and is empirically tractable. 
This extension can be exploited to handle censoring in many instances involving nonlinear 
budget sets e.g. taxation and labor supply, social security earnings test, charitable contributions, 
demand for goods with nonlinear pricing structure, 401(k) contributions.  Second, I 
nonparametrically estimate female uncompensated wage and income elasticities, taking into 
account the entire U.S. federal income tax structure, using the waves of  Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) before and after Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA-1986). Third, I estimate a 
conditional hours equation with nonparametric selection correction (Das, Newey and Vella, 
2003).  
 There are four primary findings.  First, I find statistically and economically significant 
evidence of bias induced when the nonlinearity in the budget set is ignored.  Second, the 
uncompensated wage elasticity is declining in the hourly wage and turns negative at higher wage 
rates.  This suggests a backward-bending shape for the labor supply curve.  Third, I obtain 
estimates of income elasticity that are somewhat larger (in absolute value) than the previous 
literature and statistically significant. Fourth, response on intensive margin accounts for about 40 
percent of the overall response of female labor supply due to change in wages and less than 30 
percent of total response due to income changes. I estimate an uncompensated wage elasticity of 
0.6-0.74 overall and 0.26-0.29 on the intensive margin. My estimates of income elasticity are 
somewhat higher than the previous literature and range from -0.4 to -0.67 for total hours and -
0.12 to -0.15. In particular, estimates of the income elasticity from the nonlinear budget set 
specification are about 25-30 percent higher than those from assuming a linear budget set.  These 
estimates imply a compensated elasticity of about 0.61-0.81 overall and close to 0.30 on the 
intensive margin.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
  5This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents a short review of the previous 
literature on nonlinear-budget-set and nonparametric estimation of labor supply functions.   
Section 3 forms the core of the paper, where I derive the expected hours function when labor 
supply is censored at zero.  I suggest econometric strategies to estimate the new expected hours 
function.  The econometric specification is discussed in section 4.  Section 5 provides a 
description of the data; construction of the important budget set variables; and describes the 
identification strategy.  Section 6 explains the estimation approach.  The findings are discussed 
in section 7 while section 8 concludes.   
2.  Background and Literature Review 
2.1 The Static Model with Taxes 
Let   be a strictly quasi-concave utility function in which   is consumption 
in period  ,   is hours worked, and  is a vector of exogenous taste shifters.  In a standard 
static labor supply model with taxes, the consumer maximizes the utility function in period t, 
, subject to the budget constraint: 
) , , ( t t t Z h C U t C
t t h t Z
) , , ( t t t Z h C U
) , , ( t t t t t t t E D I T y h W C − + =     ( 1 )  
where   is the gross wage,   is the unearned income,  , the taxable income of the individual, 
, the tax deductions,  , exemptions and   is a function determining tax liability.
t W t y t I
t D t E ) . ( T
6  A 
graduated tax rate and bracket structure creates a piecewise linear budget set with kinks at the 
points where the marginal tax rate changes.  Figure 1 presents the budget set for a typical 
individual under a hypothetical progressive income tax with two tax brackets. The only kink in 
the budget set is located at   hours. Earnings up to Wh are taxed at a marginal tax rate of  h 1 τ , 
                                                           
6 This is deterministic model in which wages, other income and taxes are known with certainty.  
  6where   is the dollar amount of labor earnings for working   number of hours.  Earnings 
above   are taxed at the marginal tax rate of 
Wh h
Wh 2 τ .  This tax system creates two budget set 
segments with slopes  ) 1 ( 1 τ − W , and  ) 1 ( 2 τ − W , respectively, and one kink at h.  Virtual income 
is the income associated with zero hours on each budget segment.  In Figure 1, for the first 
budget segment with a marginal tax rate of  1 τ , the virtual income is  .  However, the second 
segment yields virtual income of  .  The intuition behind using virtual income is that the 
consumer's last-dollar marginal tax rate (in the case of progressive taxation) is higher than 
marginal tax rate she faces on other parts of her budget set.  Virtual income appropriately adds a 
lump-sum transfer to the consumer's actual unearned income to account for the nonlinear 
taxation of labor income.  
v y1
v y2
Figure 1 also presents a simple labor supply example from a decline in the marginal tax 
rate on the first segment.  Individual A and B both have a convex two-segment budget set with 
one kink.  Individual A, who is located on the first segment, will work more if the substitution 
effect dominates.  But individual B, who is located on the second segment, will face only an 
income effect, even though her marginal tax rate stays the same, and if leisure is a normal good, 
will work less.   Clearly, the effect of this tax decrease in this case will be ambiguous.  
2.2  Literature Review 
  In his survey paper on kinked budget sets, Moffitt (1990) outlined four methods to deal 
econometrically with nonlinear budget constraints: (1) estimate the complete demand function; 
(2) estimate the marginal demand function; (3) instrumental-variable estimation of the marginal 
demand function; and, (4) the MLE approach.  While the latter three approaches have been used 
widely in the labor supply literature, the complete-demand-function approach is less widely used, 
  7due, in part, to its complexity.  Specifically, Hanoch and Honig (1978) are the only ones to use 
this approach by solving out for complete demand.   
The primary problem that researchers have faced when estimating marginal demand 
functions is which slope and virtual income to include in the regression specification.  Hall 
(1973) was the first to propose the idea of linearizing around the observed point on the budget 
set.  However, this method  failed to address two important problems: (1) what slope should be 
used if the individuals are bunched at kink points; and (2), how to deal with endogeneity of the 
observed after-tax wage and virtual income.  Instrumental-variable methods proposed by 
Hausman and Wise (1976) and Rosen (1976) addressed the endogeneity issue by using an 
exogenously predicted marginal tax rate as an instrument.  However, they left the issue of kink 
points unexamined.   
In their seminal paper, Burtless and Hausman (1978) proposed the MLE approach to 
effectively account for the kinks and segments on the budget set, with each segment and kink 
contributing to the likelihood function.  They also solved the problem of the endogeneity of the 
marginal tax rate.  The likelihood-function approach was further elaborated by Hausman (1981) 
and Hausman (1985).  Moffitt (1986) provided a comprehensive exposition of the maximum 
likelihood technique, and Moffitt (1990) presented an excellent survey of the problems and 
solutions available in the presence of kinked budget constraints.  
However, the MLE approach has been criticized for three reasons.  First, it imposes 
strong parametric assumptions, and limited dependent variable models have long been known to 
be sensitive to the assumption of normality.  Second, while it allows for measurement error in 
hours worked, it breaks down when the budget set variables are measured with error for other 
  8reasons (Heckman and MaCurdy, 1982; Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999).
7  Heckman and 
MaCurdy (1981) proposed a selection-bias-oriented approach to account for nonlinear budget 
sets in a way less sensitive to measurement error in the budget set.  They suggested estimating an 
ordered-choice model of location at segments and kinks and, in the second stage, using the 
inverse Mills ratio to account for selection bias.  Third, it imposes strong theoretical restrictions 
on economic behavior.  In particular, MaCurdy (1992) has argued that the MLE approach 
imposes the Slutsky restrictions at the kink points in order for the probability of observing 
individuals at the kinks to be positive and for the likelihood function to be well defined.
8  
MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch (1990) found the imposition of this constraint to be the reason 
why Hausman estimated higher substitution and lower income effects using the MLE approach.  
Other papers have found these restrictions to be relatively mild.
9 Another nontrivial problem 
with the MLE approach is that the likelihood function can be very complicated and fail to 
possess a global maximum.  To make matters worse, the likelihood function also may have 
points of nondifferentiability (Wales and Woodland, 1979).   
As an alternative estimation procedure, MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch (1990) proposed a 
smooth and differentiable budget-constraint methodology to deal with the problems posed by 
kink points.  Although originally applied with MLE, this method is also attractive for 
instrumental-variable type estimation and has been used by several papers to account for 
                                                           
7 Of course, measurement error of the budget set variables poses a problem even in the nonparametric estimation 
framework proposed by Blomquist and Newey (2002). The nonparametric instrumental variable approach of 
Blundell and Powell (2004) can be used to correct for endogeneity. Combination of the two methods will be 
explored in future work.   
8 Heim and Meyer (2004) show that this is tantamount to assuming convex preferences. 
9 Eklof and Sacklen (1999) sought to resolve the Hausman-MaCurdy controversy by showing that estimates of labor 
supply functions are so sensitive to division bias in the wage measure that this type of measurement error might well 
have contributed to the result found in MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch (1990).  The division bias caused by the wage 
measure also has been found by Ziliak and Kniesner (1999).   
  9nonlinear budget sets (Ziliak and Kniesner, 1999; Aaronson and French, 2002; Engelhardt and 
Kumar, 2003) to effectively account for kinked budget sets and endogenous variables.   
However, this approach is not without problems of its own.  First, because this method 
relies on valid instrumental variables (IV) for the after-tax wage for identification, the choice of 
instruments is critical.  It does not use all the information available on the entire budget set and 
lacks the efficiency of the MLE approach.  Second, by smoothing the budget set around the kink 
points, it essentially imputes a slope at the kink points, which is somewhat arbitrary.  Third, this 
method assumes that the observed location is the utility maximizing location, and, hence, there is 
no scope for optimization error (Moffitt, 1990).
10  
2.3 Nonparametric Estimation and Female Labor Supply 
    In most papers, the labor-supply function is chosen to be linear, even though the few 
papers that have done nonparametric estimation find evidence of misspecification for such 
models.  One reason why the labor supply function is chosen to be linear is the difficulty in 
conducting exact welfare analysis using the parameters of a well-defined utility function that 
may not exist for a nonparametric labor-supply function.
11  Blundell and Meghir (1986) found 
the fit of the simple models “unacceptably poor.”   Using data from U.K. family expenditure 
survey, they rejected the linear specification in favor of a more flexible specification of labor 
supply and found that the estimated wage elasticities exhibited significant evidence of backward-
bending behavior.  Kniesner and Li (2001) proposed estimating a male labor-supply function 
based on local linear kernel methods and found evidence of heterogeneity in wage effects using 
panel data from the SIPP.  Jang (1998) used a multivariate local linear regression approach to 
                                                           
10 The estimates from this model will be inconsistent if the individual is observed on a segment only due to 
optimization error in which case her observed price and the virtual income may not be the utility maximizing one. 
 
  10adapt to nonlinearities in the labor-supply curve and found that the elasticities obtained from 
parametric methods could be misleading.  van Soest and Gong (1998) adopted nonparametric 
modeling of the direct utility function and discrete choice methods to estimate female labor 
supply elasticities on Dutch data.  By approximating the budget set via a finite number of points, 
they found an own uncompensated wage elasticity of 1-1.2. 
Blomquist and Newey (2002) provided the most comprehensive methods for the 
nonparametric estimation of labor supply with a nonlinear budget set.  Applying their model to 
Swedish data, they found that parametric (MLE) estimates of the effect of tax reforms are 
upward biased while nonparametric estimates perform well.  Although this method is based on 
the assumption of a globally convex budget set, Blomquist and Newey (2002) found that it is 
robust to the presence of mild nonconvexity in the data. In their male labor supply application, 
censoring of hours of work was not a major issue.  However, in the context of female labor 
supply I need to explicitly account for a corner solution in hours of work, because roughly 27 
percent of married women in the sample are not in the labor force.  
 
3.  Derivation of the Expected Labor Supply Function in the Presence of Censoring: 
Maximization of  the utility function  , subject to the budget constraint  ) , , ( t t t Z H C U (1)  
yields a solution for labor supply that is a function of the individual's after-tax wage,  t ω , and 
virtual income,  : 
v
t y
                                    .                   (2)  ) ), ( ), ( ( t t
v
t t t t Z h y h f h ω =
                                                                                                                                                                                           
11 However, recent advances in deadweight loss estimation (Hausman and Newey, 1995) now allow deadweight loss 
to be estimated nonparametrically. 
  11Using the notation in Blomquist and Newey (2002), suppressing the time subscript in a static 
framework, and ignoring the exogenous taste shifters, desired hours function can be written as 
      ,              (3)  ) , , (
* η ω π
v
i y h =
where    is the virtual income, 
v y ω  is the after-tax wage, and η is an error term representing 
heterogeneity in preferences.
12  In a world with multi-segment budget set, the desired hours 
function of the   individual on the  segment is given by  th i th j
     .            (4)  ) ( ) , , (
* η π η ω π ij ij ij
v
ij ij y h = =
I will drop the subscript   as the following discussion applies to all the individuals.  i
Theorem 3.1: Under the assumptions of a convex budget constraint,   
, and   strictly increasing in  ∞ < ∫ dv g y j
v
j ) ( | ) , , ( | η η ω π ) , , ( η ω π j
v
j y η, the expected hours 
function for an individual with  segments and   J 1 − J  kinks,  in the presence of censoring  can 
be written as,  
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1 1
j j j j
v
j j l l y
− − = π ω π ) , , ( η ω π j
v
j j y η, 
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12 Although the utility maximization model assumed here is deterministic, the error specification is consistent with 
random utility hypothesis. There are two sources of stochastic variation in the labor supply function: heterogeneity 
error and measurement error. The heterogeneity error is not assumed to be additive. The measurement error is 
  12Proof: See Appendix 1. 
The first term in (5), 
     ) , ( J
v
J y ω π =                         (7)  ∫
∞
∞ −
η η η π d g J ) ( ) (
is the expected labor supply on the  (last) segment.  Blomquist and Newey (2002) assumed 
that        
th J
            0 ) | 0 Pr( = = x h ,              (8) 
so that the second term in (5) disappears, i.e., 
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The third term in (5),  







j l y l y + +
=
− ∑ ω μ ω μ ]
                                                                                                                                                                                          
represents the bias due to nonlinearity of the budget set.  
    Blomquist and Newey (2002) modeled the first term in (10) nonparametrically as a 
function of wage and virtual income on the last segment.  The second term in (10) is the bias 
term that arises due to nonlinearity and is additive in all the segments and kinks. In the presence 
of censoring in the dependent variable, the probability of not working is positive and one needs 
to model (9) as it is not non-zero.  Theorem 3.2 below shows that this additional term can be 
accounted for in a straightforward manner. 
 
assumed to be additive but the estimation method is valid in the presence of heteroscdastic error term that might 
  13Theorem 3.2: Under the assumptions of convex budget constraint,   
, and   strictly increasing in  ∞ < ∫ η η η ω π d g y j
v
j ) ( | ) , , ( | ) , , ( η ω π j
v
j y η, the expected hours 
function in the presence of censoring  can be written as,  
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Proof: Without imposing the assumption that    , 0 ) | 0 Pr( = = x h the expression for expected labor 
supply is given by (5), i.e. 
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            QED 
In (12), the new nonlinearity bias term consists of  
  [] [] ) , , ( ) , , (     ) , ( ) , ( 1 1
1 - J
1 j
1 1 j j j j j j J J w y w y w y w y η μ η μ π π + +
=
− + − ∑          (17) 
Each term in (12) has an intuitive interpretation.  The first term is the expectation of the hours 
function if the individual is maximizing utility on the first segment of the budget set and faces an 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
result in a random utility model (Brown and Walker, 1989). 
  14after-tax wage based on the first-dollar marginal tax rate and, therefore, represents average hours 
if the individual has a linear budget set and appropriately accounts for censoring in choice of 
leisure.
13  The derivatives of this term are comparable to uncompensated wage and income 
effects assuming a linear budget set.  The second term and third term in (12) capture the 
nonlinearity of the budget set and will disappear if there is no nonlinearity in the budget set. 
They can be interpreted as an analogue of the inverse Mill’s ratio correcting for potential bias 
due to the nonlinearity of the budget set.  If unobservables in the underlying labor supply 
function are correlated with the unobservables determining the individual’s location on different 
segments and kink points, these terms will not be zero and the estimates of the wage and income 
effects will be biased.  
The expected hours function in (13) has a familiar structure if we assume that the 
underlying labor supply function on the   segment is linear so that,   th j
                 ( 1 8 )   ,
* β j x h =
and, assuming without loss of generality that the budget set consists of two segments and one 
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]    (19) 
where  ) Pr( ) ( z z F < = η .  Heckman and MaCurdy (1982) suggested estimating the parameters of 
this function by assuming that η is normally distributed, estimating   and  ) (z F
                                                           
13 To see this more clearly note that the second and third terms disappear if the budget set is linear. Then there is just 
one tax rate and to estimate the parameters of the labor supply function, we would use usual methods to deal with 
censored dependent variables e.g. Tobit or semiparametric estimators depending upon what we want to assume 
about the error distribution. 
  15) | ( β η η j x l E − < using an ordered probit, and then estimating (19) by least squares in the second 
stage. 
If the assumptions of linearity of the labor supply function, additivity of η, and normality 
are imposed in (13),  then the expected hours function can be written as  
                  (20)  {}   ) / (         ) / (                
) 0 , | ( * ) | 0 ( ) | (
σ β σλ β σ β x x x
h x h E x h P X h E
+ Φ =
> > =
where    ) / ( σ β x Φ is the CDF of the normal standard normal distribution and  ) / ( σ β λ x , the 
inverse Mills ratio.
 14   
The following four cases summarize the different possibilities when estimating the 
expected labor supply function:   
Case 1: There is no censoring and the budget set is nonlinear.  In this case the expected labor 
supply function is given by (10) as derived in Blomquist and Newey (2002). 
Case 2: There is no censoring and the budget set is linear.  In this case bias due to nonlinearity is 
zero and the expected labor supply function is given by (7).  This can be estimated using 
nonparametric estimation methods such as kernel regression or series estimation (Hausman and 
Newey, 1995). 
Case 3: There is censoring and the budget set is nonlinear.  Then the expected labor supply 
function is given by (12).  This expression is additive in several nonparametric functions.  It can 
be estimated by approximating the different terms with a power series or spline.  Semiparametric 
methods such as Symmetrically Censored Least Squares (SCLS) (Powell, 1986) and Censored 
Least Absolute Deviations (CLAD) (Powell, 1984) can be used to econometrically handle the 
                                                           
14 This expression is derived in most econometrics textbooks.  One can even use least squares to estimate the 
parameters of this function if  Φ   and λ  are estimated using a Probit (Amemiya ,1985).  
  16censoring in hours of work.
15  Alternatively, as suggested in Blomquist and Newey (2002), the 
expected labor supply function (12) can be estimated conditional on participation in the labor 
force along with a labor force participation equation. 
Case 4: There is censoring and the budget set is linear.  In this case again bias due to 
nonlinearity is zero and the expected labor supply function collapses to a nonparametric function 
in net wage evaluated at the first dollar and virtual income, censored at zero. It can be estimated 
using nonparametric methods for censored variables (e.g., Lewbel and Linton, 2003). 
 
4.  Econometric Specification 
In the empirical analysis of female labor supply, I use the method from Case 3 above, where the 
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   (21) 
where  it η  represents heterogeneity error and  it ε  represents measurement error in hours of work, 
is the virtual income, 
v
it y it ω , the after-tax wage and  represents other demographic variables, 
i.e.,  age, number of children in different age ranges, and self reported health status.  Thus there 
are two sources of stochastic variation in the model in 
it z
(21): individual level heterogeneity and 
measurement error in hours.
16 Let  it x  be the vector of all explanatory variables 
. I allow the effect of regressors other than after-tax wage and  11 1 ( ... , ... , ... , )
vv
it itJ it itJ it itJ it yy l l z ωω −
                                                           
15 For a motivation on the idea to use semiparametric estimators such as SCLS and CLAD to estimate flexible 
regression functions, see Lewbel and Linton (2003).  
16 Most papers using MLE approach estimate at most a dual error term model, one error capturing heterogeneity and 
the other denoting either measurement or optimization error. 
  17virtual income to enter the hours function linearly as done in (Blomquist and Newey, 2002; Wu, 
2002).  I follow Blomquist and Newey (2002) in assuming that  ( | ) 0 it it Ex ε =  and 
(,)0 it it Cov η ε = . In the remainder of the paper, I will call the expected labor supply function 
(21), the “censored specification” as it is estimated with nonworking females in the data with 
zero hours. 
  An attractive feature of (21) is that the linear budget set specification is nested within the 
nonlinear budget set specification. I can test for the exclusion of the nonlinearity bias term in 
(21). Similarly, the widely used linear labor supply specification is also nested within (21) as one 
can test the null hypothesis whether the coefficients on higher powers and interactions of 
 enter significantly. 
v y   and   ω
5.  Data 
   I use data on female labor supply from the 1985 and 1989 waves of the PSID.  The PSID 
began in 1968, and is a longitudinal study of a representative sample of U.S. individuals and the 
family units in which they reside.  The sample consists of married women.   Women belonging 
to Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) subsample were excluded from the analysis sample 
as they were nonrandomly selected.   The final sample consists of 1771 married women.  Table 1 
provides the descriptive statistics on selected variables. Figure A1 in Appendix 1 presents a 
distribution of the annual hours worked in the data.
17 Table A1 in Appendix 1 provides and 
accounting for observations excluded from the sample. 
5.1 Identification Strategy 
 
The data used in the paper satisfies the conditions for identification derived in Blomquist and 
Newey (2002). A primary condition for identification is that we should have individuals with 
  18observations on both the first dollar and the last dollar wage and virtual income. We have this 
information for everyone in the sample. I use both cross-sectional as well as time-series variation 
in budget set variables to identify the wage and income effect. The dataset used in this paper 
spans one of the most comprehensive tax reforms- Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 1986). In 
particular, drastic change in the budget set of individuals brought about by TRA 1986 due to 
reduction in the number of federal tax brackets, aids in identification. I also use the state level 
variation in tax rates to identify the labor supply effects of tax reforms. The calculation of kinks 
and slopes takes into account this state level variation in tax rules. The expected labor supply 
function derived in the paper can be thought of consisting of two components: the average labor 
supply function when the budget set is linear; and a term that corrects for the nonlinearity of the 
budget set. The former depends on the first dollar tax rate, which in a secondary earner married 
females is the just the last dollar tax rate of the husband. Thus there is sufficient variation in the 
first dollar budget set slopes and virtual incomes which help in identification.
18
  I must mention one important caveat to the identification strategy in this paper. In line 
with a voluminous literature in labor economics I trate gross wage as exogenous. This 
assumption will clearly be violated if wages are correlated with unobserved taste for leisure or if 
wages and hours are jointly determined. However, the nonlinear budget set approach of 
Blomquist and Newey (2002) fully takes into account the endogeneity of the marginal tax rate 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
17 The observed distribution of the hours in the data should, to some extent, mitigate the concern that there is 
insufficient variation in the number of hours worked. 
18I did not include a fixed effect in the specification presented in equation (21) as it became collinear with the cross 
sectional variation. It is important to use the cross-sectional variation as the time series variation may not suffice. 
Handling fixed effects in a nonparametric context presents additional challenges that are beyond the scope of this 
paper and will be explored in future research. Although the inclusion of a fixed effect would help in dealing with 
possible endogeneity of after tax wage and virtual income, in the estimation framework of Blomquist and Newey 
(2002), variation in the entire budget set of the individuals mitigates that concern somewhat. Another reason why, 
fixed effects may not be very useful is that an important source of stochastic variation is heterogeneity error which 
has been modeled nonparametrically. 
  19and hence the net wage and virtual income by considering the complete budget set of the 
individual.
19
5.2 Construction of the budget set variables 
The tax information for all the individuals in the dataset was obtained using the NBER TAXSIM 
calculator (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993).  To determine all of the slopes and kinks, I ran a grid of 
adjusted gross income (AGI) levels from 0 to $200,000 at increments of $1000, through 
TAXSIM.
20  The federal marginal tax rate information for every income level was used to 
calculate the slopes and kinks for every individual.  I assumed that females are secondary 
earners.  So, while laying out the budget set, I assumed that a married female’s budget set would 
start after the husband’s last-dollar tax rate.
21  This further helped in reducing the dimensionality 
of the budget set by reducing the number of kinks and segments.  The payroll tax was taken into 
account in making the budget set of the individual.  To further reduce the dimensionality of the 
budget set, I assumed an upper limit of 5000 on number of hours worked.
22   
                                                           
19Exogeneity of gross wage is a standard assumption in the literature on taxation and labor supply.  In this context 
the most important issue is the endogeneity of the marginal tax rate due to nonlinear nature of the budget set. The 
endogeneity of taxes contaminates the net wage and virtual income variables and is solved by an instrumental 
variable approach if the budget set is linearized (Ziliak and Kniesner, 1999; Eissa, 1995; Blundell, Duncan and 
Meghir, 1998) or by using the global information on the complete budget set (Burtless and Hausman, 1978; Triest, 
1990, Heim and Meyer, 2004; Blomquist and Newey, 2002;). For a discussion of how fully accounting for 
nonlinearity solves the endogeneity of taxes, also see Heckman and MaCurdy (1982).  
20 More specifically, I ran data on every individual through taxsim to obtain the marginal tax rate at every point of 
the grid of labor income. This allowed me to calculate slopes and kinks for every individual conditional on other 
characteristics i.e. tax filing status, marital status and other variable required by taxsim. 
21The secondary earner model is a standard assumption in much of literature on taxes and female labor supply (e.g., 
Hausman, 1985; Triest, 1990; Eissa, 1995). In this model the labor supply decisions within the family are sequential 
with the husband choosing his labor supply under the assumption of no other labor income and them wife chooses 
her labor supply conditional on husband’s labor income. Of course, if labor supply decisions are made at the family 
level, the individual labor supply will also depend on spouse’s wages and the pooled income and the estimates 
presented here will be biased. The direction of the bias is generally not known and depends on the relationship 
between labor supply and wages of the spouse (whether they are substitutes are complements). There is no 
consensus on this relationship. Further the unitary model of family labor supply has been found to be restrictive as 
the assumptions of Slutsky symmetry and income pooling do not stand up to econometric testing. Collective models 
of family labor supply relax this assumption and assume that labor supply decisions are Pareto-efficient (Chiappori, 
1988) or they are Nash-bargained solutions (Mcelroy, 1981). In these models assumption of household production is 
a problem (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). Combining the estimation approach presented here in the framework of 
collective labor supply is something that I will pursue in future research. 
22 There were inconsequentially small number of individuals in the sample who worked more than 5000 hours. 
  20I do not compute the gross wage by dividing annual earnings by number of hours, 
because this induces division bias.  The self reported measure of wage that I use has been found 
to be a more robust measure of wage (Ziliak and Kniesner, 1999). In PSID, the information on 
wife’s hourly wage was collected from the head. First, the head was asked whether the wife was 
salaried or paid by the hour. The follow up question was: “How much is her salary?” The values 
for this variable represent dollars and cents per hour; if salary is given as an annual figure, it is 
divided by 2000 hours per year; if weekly, by 40 hours per week.    
Figure 2 presents the tax structure before and after TRA 1986 for a person filing married 
jointly, claiming two dependent exemptions and under age 65. As the figure suggests TRA 1986 
resulted in a remarkable simplification of the budget set. Figure 3 shows the distribution of 
number of kinks before and after TRA 1986. After TRA 1986 most individuals ended up with 
three or less kinks in their budget set.
23  The budget set before the tax reform was highly 
nonlinear. This dramatic simplification in the tax code and the budget set is a crucial source of 
identification in the estimation framework suggested in Blomquist and Newey (2002). 
There are three potential sources of nonconvexity in the budget set: the Earned Income 
Tax Credit (EITC), the payroll tax and fixed costs.  Because, I assume that married females are 
secondary earners, very few individuals face the nonconvex portion due to the EITC.
24  The 
nonconvexity caused by the cap on the payroll tax, occurs at an extremely high number of hours.   
                                                           
23 While looking at the number of kinks it is important to keep in mind that in a secondary earner model, the budget 
set of wives starts with the marginal tax rate of the husband as the tax rate on the first segment. 
24 The first dollar tax rate for married women in a secondary earner’s model is the last dollar tax rate on her husband. 
Thus, wife’s budget set only begins at husband’s marginal tax rate. Nonconvexities can be addressed specifically by 
including additional terms in the estimating equation (13). However they will raise the dimesionality in 
nonparametric estimation.  Therefore I account for  nonconvexities in the budget set by taking a convex hull 
(MaCurdy, Greene and Paarsch, 1990). This method does not offer a tractable solution to nonconvexities caused due 
to fixed costs of work. Incorporating fixed costs of work in the estimation framework derived in this paper is a 
potential area of future research. Nevertheless, one of the attractive features of the nonparametric estimation 
approach based on estimator proposed in Blomquist and Newey (2002) is that the integration over individual 
heterogeneity term η helps mitigate the problem caused by nonconvex budget sets. 
  216.  Estimation 
6.1 Estimation of Labor Supply Function with Censored Hours 
The resulting model for the expected hours of work, as derived in Theorem 3.1, results directly 
from utility maximization over a globally convex budget constraint.  It is useful to consider 
nonparametric estimators that facilitate imposing additivity implied by the model.  Series 
estimation is particularly useful in estimating models like this (Stone, 1985).
25   To account for 
censoring, I have estimated the model using the Symmetrically Censored Least Squares (SCLS) 
(Powell, 1986)
26   
  The econometric specification (21) is additive in nonparametric components that depend 
on slope, virtual income and variables representing the nonlinearity of the budget set.  The 
demographic variables enter linearly.  Hausman and Newey (1995) showed that using power-
series approximations to model the nonparametric components conveniently results in partialling 
out the linear component of (21) in the sense of Robinson (1988). 
6.2 Nonparametric Estimation of the Reduced Form Participation Equation 
I estimated the following reduced form labor force participation equation using lacally weighted 
regression methods. 
   (22)  (1 | , ) ( , , 6 ) it it it it it it it P dLFP age education m age education children yrs e == < +
it dLFP  is a dummy variable for labor force participation of individual i at time t. Letting the 
vector  it x  contain( , , 6 ) it it age education children yrs < , the nonparametric regression function is 
                                                           
25 One can in principle do nonparametric kernel estimation of the regression function and the derivatives but there is 
no obvious way to impose additivity in kernel regressions. 
26 SCLS is the least square counterpart of estimating regression functions with censored dependent variables. The 
estimation proceeds in a recensoring step and then a regression step using least squares. The Censored Least 
Absolute Deviation (CLAD) estimator uses median regression instead of least squares. I estimated all the 
specifications using CLAD and found that the results were similar to SCLS. I report only the SCLS results in the 
paper.  For an excellent intuitive discussion of  SCLS and CLAD, see Chay and Powell (2001). 
  22estimated by local polynomial smoothing that minimizes the following criterion function (Cleveland, 
Devlin and Grosse, 1988): 
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) (  is a nonnegative weight function with bandwidth h.
27 The weight 
function varies inversely with the distance between and x and its   neighbor . Local 
polynomial regression has many desirable properties including bias reduction feature at the 
boundary of the distribution. The choice of bandwidth hdetermines the rate of decrease in 
weight with increase in distance between 
th i i x
xand . The regression function is estimated as 
. I selected the bandwidth using generalized cross-validation (Craven 
and Wahba, 1979). 
i x
0 ˆ ˆ(, ) it it m age education b =
6.3 Nonparametric Estimation of the Wage Equation 
The specification derived in (21) requires wage data for everyone in the sample- workers and 
non-workers. Due to the non-availability of gross wages for non-workers, the imputed wage was 
used for non-workers, as has been done by previous researchers (e.g. Hausman and Ruud, 1986; 
Van Soest, Woittiez and Kapteyn, 1990).  To be consistent with the nonparametric estimation 
strategy, I estimated a nonparametric wage equation with nonparametric selection correction 
using the estimator proposed in Das, Newey and Vella (2003). The procedure involves 
estimating the propensity score from a first stage nonparametric regression of the selection 
equation and then entering them nonparametrically (e.g. power series, spline, kernel) in the 
primary equation. The following wage equation was estimated: 
                                                           
27 I used the tricube weight function    1 0 , ) 1 ( ) (
3 3 ≤ ≤ − = u u u K
  23   1 ˆ (| , ) ( , ) ( it it it it it it E Wage age education g age education g2 ) ψ = +    (24) 
where  it ψ ˆ  is the estimated propensity score from the nonparametric estimation of the labor force 
participation equation. The wage equation was modeled as an additive function of age and 
education and the estimated propensity score from the first step. I used Generalized Additive 
Model (Hastie and Tibshirani, 1990), to estimate the wage equation.
28 The nonparametrically 
estimated wage equation was used to impute wages for non-workers, to estimate the censored 
specification.  
6.4 Hours Elasticities Conditional on Working 
One of the important characteristics of female labor supply is its tendency to be elastic on both 
participation and intensive margins. While estimates from equation (21) give us the overall labor 
supply elasticity, it is more informative to be able to calculate the labor supply response both on 
the participation and the intensive margin. Moreover recent work shows that female labor supply 
is more responsive on the participation margin (cite Heckman, 1994; Heim, 2004).
29  
Blomquist and Newey (2002) suggest that when the probability of nonparticipation is 
positive, a simultaneous estimation of the labor force participation decision and the hours of 
work conditional on participation may be considered. Accordingly, I estimated equation (21) 
only on the sample that worked positive hours by including a selection bias term estimated from 
                                                           
28 In this estimation method the underlying assumption is that mean of wage depends on age and education through a 
nonlinear link function. For example if mean of wage is ϖ then it is linked to age, education and the selection 
correction term by the function ) ( ) , ( ) ( 2 1 it it it g education age g f ψ ϖ + = . I used a gaussian link function.  The 
unknown functions   and  ) , ( 1 it it education age g ) ( 2 it g ψ are estimated flexibly by smoothing. I used a cubic 
smoothing spline to estimate the  functions. The smoothing parameter or the degrees of freedom was chosen 
using generalized cross-validation. 
(.)
i g
29 The typical censored estimator in the Tobit framework also constrains the parameters on the extensive and the 
intensive margin to be the same and imposes a continuous labor supply restriction. Estimating the selection 
corrected hours equation mitigates this concern somewhat.  
  24a reduced form nonparametric regression of the decision to work on age and education.
30  More 
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   (25)   
where ) ˆ ( it f ψ is a function of  the estimated propensity score from estimating the labor force 
participation equation (22). Since (25) has age and higher order terms in it, education and its 
higher orders serve as the exclusion restrictions to identify the selection bias correction term in 
estimating  (21) only on workers. This strategy for selection correction closely follows Das, 
Newey and Vella (2003). The difference in the estimated elasticities from estimating (21) on the 
entire sample and equation (25) on the sample of workers gives us an indication of the relative 
importance of extensive or the intensive margin.
31
6.5 Estimation of Nonparametric Labor Supply Function with Nonlinear Budget Sets 
The first three terms of the specification in (21) and (25) are approximated nonparametrically 
using power series, as in Blomquist and Newey (2002) and Hausman and Newey (1995). For 
ease of exposition, in this section I drop the subscripts i and   for individuals and time 
respectively and just keep the subscripts for segment
t
j . The first term in (21) is approximated as  





v K y y y ω ϕ ω ϕ ω ϕ =
                                                           
30 I also estimated the labor participation equation using the single index model estimator proposed in Klein and 
Spady (1993). The results were similar. 
31Estimation of (21) on the entire sample using censored regression methods yields an estimate of the total elasticity.  
Estimation of the labor supply function derived in (25), in turn, provides an estimate of the elasticity on the intensive 
margin. Using the decomposition suggested in McDonalds and Moffit(1980) then allows me to recover the 
participation elasticity as the difference between the total and intensive margin. Triest (1990) use a similar insight. I 
did not estimate a structural labor force participation analogue of (22) as nonlinearities in the budget set play a less 
important role in the participation decision unless there are fixed costs of work. Accounting for fixed costs of work 
is beyond the scope of this paper. If fixed costs are ignored, the labor force participation decision will be based on 
the wage on the first segment of the budget set. 
  25where  
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ω ϕ θ . I chose θ  using SBIC and AIC 
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  26where   is the   kink.  j l
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For observations  , let   be a matrix of all the approximating 
functions for all the individuals.  For the vector of coefficients on the approximating functions, a 
series estimator for hours of work is defined as 
n i ,..., 1 = )]' ( ),..., ( [ 1 n
K K x x ϖ ϖ = Γ
      ,                  (32)  β ϖ ˆ )' ( ) ( ˆ x x h
K =
and 
                           (33)  h ' ) ' ( ˆ Γ Γ Γ = β
respectively. 
 
  Selection of the number of terms in the power series,K , is an important part of 
estimation.  This is analogous to choosing the bandwidth for nonparametric kernel regression. I 
use well known Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz, Bayesian. Information 
Criterion (SBIC) to select the best model. It is well-known from lag-length selection in time 
series that AIC overestimates the order of the model (Shibata, 1976). So I put more emphasis on 
SBIC to select the best model.
34
7.  Estimation Results 
The estimated wage and income elasticities from five models are presented in Table 2-7.  
The number and description of terms included are presented in the note to the tables.  Each of 
                                                           
34 Both these criteria penalize the model fit for number of included regressors. The SBIC imposes a heavier penalty 
and so leans towards a more parsimonious model (Greene ,2003). 
  27these tables present the estimated marginal effects and elasticities with respect to wage and 
income, the compensated elasticity and the estimated effect of change in the budget set due to 
TRA 1986 on Labor supply. Tables 2, 3 and 6 present the results for the censored specification 
(21) while Tables 4, 5 and 7 show analogous results for the conditional hours specification (25).  
Tables 2-5 present the results from approximating   in  ∫
∞




) ( ) (
π
η η η π d g (21) and (25) as a 1
st to a 
5
th order polynomial in wage and income to nonparametrically model the expected labor supply 
function. Tables 6 and 7 present results from robustness check for the censored hours 
specification and the conditional hours specification respectively. Robustness results are 
presented for the preferred specification for the nonparametric term with a fourth order 
polynomial. For Tables 2-5, column 1 presents results for a 1
st order polynomial, column 2 for 1 
2
nd order polynomial and so on. 1
st order polynomial collapses to a linear labor supply function 
and so the first column of Tables 2-5 contains the results for a linear specification of labor 
supply.
35 The results are presented for specifications controlling for the nonlinearity bias i.e. the 
second the third terms in (21) and without including these terms i.e. imposing the assumption 
that the budget set is linear. Table 3 and 4 present results for the censored hours specification 
while Tables 5 and 6 show analogous estimates for the conditional hours specifications. 
7.1 Censored Hours Specification 
In Table 2 i.e. for censored hours specification with nonlinear budget set, the estimate of 
the wage elasticity increases from 0.31 for a linear specification in column 1 to 0.60 for the 
specification with a 4
th order polynomial in column 4. The wage elasticity estimate in column 1 
                                                           
35This specification is comparable to reduced form labor supply specifications in many studies that proxy the 
observed net wage with the net wage evaluated at the first dollar or at a synthetic marginal tax rate computed by 
assuming a constant number of hours for each individual in the sample.  This strategy has been adopted many papers 
to circumvent the problem with the endogeneity of the observed after-tax-wage, e.g., Rosen (1976), Hausman and 
Wise (1976), Heim (2005). 
  28is akin to a semiparametric counterpart of the typical linear labor supply estimation estimated 
with nonlinear budget set method using maximum likelihood (e.g. Triest, 1990).
36 The estimates 
in column 1 can also be compared with linear labor supply specifications using the after-tax-
wage evaluated at the first-dollar marginal tax rate as an instrument for the endogenously 
observed after-tax-wage.
37  The income elasticity increases (in absolute value) from -0.54 to -
0.71.
38 The compensated elasticity increases from 0.40 to 0.71. Thus Table 2 indicates that 
including higher powers of wage and virtual income and their interactions increases the labor 
supply elasticities.
 39 Comparison across columns 1-5 in Table 2 and Table 3 gives a sense of the 
sensitivity of estimated effects and elasticities to flexible specifications of the average labor 
supply function in net wage and virtual income. Comparing Table 2 with the corresponding 
columns in Table 3 shows the effect of including the terms due to nonlinearity of the budget set. 
In general, the elasticities increase with more flexible specifications and when nonlinearity bias 
                                                           
36The semiparametric nature stems from not assuming any distributions for the error term by estimating it using 
Symmetrically Censored Least Squares. This estimator just imposes symmetry of the error distribution. Estimating a 
labor supply function with the terms included to control for the nonlinearity of the budget set using a Tobit 
likelihood function should yield estimates comparable to Hausman’s maximum likelihood method albeit with less 
efficiency as the expected labor supply function in Blomquist and Newey (2002) approach uses only information on 
the first moment. I estimated the censored hours specification using Tobit and found that estimated elasticities were 
twice as large as the ones obtained in column (1) of table 4. The estimates were comparable with maximum 
likelihood estimates in Triest (1990) who used 1983 wave of the PSID and estimated both a censored and a 
truncated estimator. The results from a truncated specification for a linear labor supply in Triest (1990) are 
comparable to the estimates reported in column (1) of table 5.  
37 For example, Eissa (1995) who estimates an elasticity of around 0.6-1 for females married to high income men. 
38These estimates are comparable within the range of estimates surveyed in Heckman and Killingsworth (1983) and 
Mroz (1987).  However, the income elasticity estimated here is on the higher side of the literature on estimation of 
female labor supply tax effects in a nonlinear budget set environment, using the PSID.  Hausman (1981) estimated 
income elasticity for females working full time of -0.5.  Triest (1990) estimated income elasticity between -0.15 to -
0.31.  Rosen (1976) estimated an income elasticity of -0.42.  Hausman and Ruud (1986) estimated -0.36.  Thus, my 
estimates of income elasticity are qualitatively similar to the previous literature.  
39The elasticities are calculated at the sample mean of after-tax wage and virtual income on the first segment of 
$5.21 and $34,700 respectively and at mean annual hours of 1140. These means are over both workers and 
nonworkers. This implied a share of earnings relative to non-labor income of 0.17, used to compute the compensated 
elasticity using the formula  , where  ,  ,  are the compensated, wage and income elasticities and 
the budget share. 
EE E b cwy =− Ec Ew Ey
b
  29terms are included.
40  I performed a Wald test to test the significance of the nonlinearity bias 
terms and P-values indicate that these terms cannot be excluded from the specification.   Both 
AIC and SBIC criterion are minimized for the cubic polynomial specification.  
7.2 Hours Elasticities Conditional on Participation 
Tables 4 and 5 present the estimates of marginal effects and elasticities on the intensive margin 
from estimating equation (25) i.e. restricting the sample to workers while correcting 
nonparametrically for selection bias. The estimated intensive margin elasticities are 30-40 
percent of the magnitude of the estimates of total hours elasticities in Tables 2 and 3, suggesting 
that estimated labor supply is more responsive on the participation margin both with respect to 
wages and non-labor income. The wage elasticity ranges from 0.18 to 0.29 from column 1 to 5. 
The income elasticity varies from -0.11 to -0.15.
41 The results mirror the findings in the censored 
hours case as the elasticities are higher in specifications with higher order terms. However, 
controlling for the nonlinearity bias term does not seem to matter. This suggests that modeling 
the nonlinearity of the budget set is even more important when there is nonparticipation.
42
7.3 Robustness Check 
Tables 6 and 7 indicate that the estimated marginal effects and elasticities are fairly robust to 
inclusion of other regressors. These results are from modeling the first term in (21) and  (25) as a 
4
th order polynomial. Column 1 contains the results from the baseline specification with children 
below six years, quartic in age and poor health as controls, additional regressors included are 
race, union (column 2), a dummy if years equals 1985 (column 3). Column 4, 5 and 6 include 
                                                           
40 Of course the confidence intervals around the estimates obtained from specifications including the bias term and 
those obtained without including the bias term overlap, indicating that the difference is not statistically significant. 
But the terms representing the bias term in (21) were jointly statistically significant. 
41 The elasticities are calculated at the sample mean of after-tax wage and virtual income on the first segment of 
$5.35 and $32,960 respectively and at mean annual hours of 1616, for working individuals. 
42 This may also mean that fixed costs are important as they alter the budget set of the individuals in such a way that 
accounting for nonlinear budget set becomes important even for modelling participation decision (Hausman, 1980).  
  30occupation fixed effects, state fixed effects and occupation and state interactions respectively. 
The estimated wage elasticities range from 0.5 to 0.7 for the censored hours specification and are 
remarkably stable at around 0.27 for the hours regression conditional on working. The income 
elasticities range from -0.4 to -0.67 for the censored specification and about -0.14 for the 
conditional hours specification.
43  The AIC and SBIC criteria suggest picking the baseline 
model. 
Figures 6-11 present a graphical illustration of the downward bias in magnitudes of the 
estimated elasticities when the nonlinearity bias term is omitted from the specification in (21) or 
(25). The downward bias is larger for the less flexible specifications and is the largest for the 
linear labor supply specification. This suggests that inclusion of higher powers and interactions 
of net wage and virtual income partially captures the misspecification due to omission of the 
nonlinearity bias terms. Figures 8 and 9 indicate that the downward bias in estimated income 
elasticities is more pronounced for the censored hours specification than for the conditional 
hours specification. 
7.4 Effects of TRA 1986 
TRA 1986 resulted in changes in the budget set of individuals belonging to different groups. The 
variation in the budget sets can be used to identify the average effect of change in tax structure 
on labor supply. After estimating the parameters of the labor supply function, it is 
straightforward to calculate nonparametrically, the effect of the tax change from the difference 
between estimated average labor supply responses based on pre and post-TRA1986 budget set. 
Let the budget set before and after TRA1986 be 
86 TRA pre Z
−  and
86 TRA post Z
−  respectively, then as 
                                                           
43 The wage elasticity estimates found in this paper are within the range of estimates presented in the previous 
literature. Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) tabulate the results from several studies. The estimates are clustered around 
0.7-1, although they are highly sensitive to estimation method.  
  31suggested in Blomquist and Newey (2002), the estimated tax change effect of the tax reform can 
be written as
44
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I evaluated   at the mean of individual characteristics. The 
estimates measure the impact of the experiment of changing the budget set of an individual- with 
mean net wage, virtual income and other characteristics- from pre-TRA1986 to post-TRA1986 
while holding all the variables constant at the pre-1986 level. The results are presented in the row 
labeled “Tax Change Effect”.  Even though the effects were imprecisely estimated, the point 
estimates lend support to the claim that accounting for nonlinearity matters in measuring the tax 
change effects. The estimated TRA 1986 effect calculated from nonlinear budget set estimation 
exceeds that obtained from imposing a linear budget set. Using the censored specification, TRA-
1986 increased labor supply by about 4-6% at the sample mean. On the intensive margin, the 
response was lower at about 1%. This suggests that most of the labor supply effects of TRA 1986 
may have been on the participation margin.
) ( ˆ   and   ) ( ˆ 86 86 TRA pre
i
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7.5 Behavior of the Labor Supply Curve at different Wage Levels 
Nonparametric modeling of labor supply allows one to robustly quantify elasticities at 
different points in the distributions of the wage and virtual income.  The most widely-used 
                                                           
44 The estimation of average tax effects is based on individuals who are observed in both time-periods. Specifically, 
I calculated the effect of changing the pre-TRA 1986 budget set to post-TRA 1986 budget set while holding constant 
the pre-TRA 1986 characteristics at the mean. Of course, the main contribution of this paper in estimating tax 
change effects of TRA 1986 is that they are based on nonparametric estimates using Blomquist and Newey (2002). 
45The estimated response of TRA 1986 in this paper is much lower than the estimated in Eissa (1995) who estimated 
a response of 12.3% and 14.6% for women in the 75
th percentile and 90
th percentile of the income distribution 
respectively. The corresponding participation response was 4.3% and 11.4% respectively. However, given that 
estimates in this paper are for average married women, the differences between the two sets of estimates can be 
explained by the difference in points of the income distribution. 
  32models for labor supply constrain the marginal effects to be constant by estimating a linear labor 
supply curve. With a flexible labor supply function estimated in this paper, I can examine the 
nonlinear behavior of the labor supply curve with respect to wage levels.
46 The marginal effects 
are calculated at the mean non-labor income while allowing the wage to vary. Figures 4 and 5 
plot the estimates of marginal effects of wage and income against a grid of wages under two 
scenarios, (1) controlling for the bias term in (21), and, (2) omitting the bias term due to 
nonlinearity of the budget set in (21) and imposing a linear budget set.  The effect of the bias is 
apparent from the vertical distance between the solid line and the dashed line.  In Figure 4, the 
response to changes in the wage declines with increases in the wage rate.  At higher wages, of 
say above $12, the uncompensated wage elasticity from the nonlinear budget set specification  
turns negative, which suggests that the labor supply curve exhibits a backward-bending behavior.  
Not accounting for bias due to nonlinearity of the budget set results in underestimation of the 
wage effect at lower wages, while for higher wages, there is an upward bias.  Figure 5 shows 
how the income effect varies with wage.  The income effect is also decreasing in wages. For 
most parts of the wage distribution, the effect of not accounting for a nonlinear budget set leads 
to an underestimation of the income effect.  Figure 4 indicates that labor supply curve is 
backward-bending. Even though the income effect is declining in wage, at higher wages income 
effect is still large enough to dominate a steeply falling uncompensated wage effect. It is 
interesting to note that the linear budget set specification does not capture the backward-bending 





                                                           
46In a flexible labor supply specification, the wage effect will vary with wage and income levels due to the 
interaction terms between wage and income included in the specification. 
  338.  Conclusions and Extensions 
 
Estimating demand models assuming that the agent’s budget set is linear, when, in fact, 
there are kinks in the budget set, can produce estimates of behavioral parameters that are biased 
and inconsistent.  Most existing studies on taxes and labor supply in the presence of a nonlinear 
budget set have used either Hausman’s Maximum Likelihood approach or instrumental-variables 
estimation of the marginal labor supply function.  While the Maximum Likelihood approach 
relies on strong parametric assumptions for consistency, the instrumental-variables requires a 
valid instrument for the marginal tax rate.  Recently, Blomquist and Newey (2002) have 
proposed an estimation strategy that does not rely on arbitrary distributional or functional form 
assumptions and effectively accounts for the bias due to nonlinearities in the budget set.   
In this paper, I extend their estimator to the case where the dependent variable is 
censored.  I augment the sparse literature on nonparametric estimation of labor supply models 
and apply the newly-suggested method to estimate female labor supply elasticities.  I investigate 
both possible sources of bias in estimates of wage and income elasticities for female labor 
supply: first, due to restrictive functional forms and, second, by ignoring nonlinearity of the 
budget set.   
The wage and income elasticities are underestimated if the nonlinearity is ignored.  I 
estimate an uncompensated wage elasticity of 0.6-0.74 overall and 0.26-0.29 on the intensive 
margin. My estimates of income elasticity are somewhat higher than the previous literature and 
range from -0.4 to -0.67 for total hours and -0.12 to -0.15 on the intensive margin. In particular, 
estimates of the income elasticity from the nonlinear budget set specification are about 25-30 
percent higher than those from assuming a linear budget set.  These estimates imply a 
compensated elasticity of about 0.61-0.81 overall and close to 0.30 on the intensive margin.  All 
  34the elasticities are statistically significant.  I also find evidence that the wage elasticity is 
declining in the wage, and the labor supply curve is backward-bending. The nonparametric 
estimates imply that TRA 1986 was associated with an increase in labor supply of 4-5% at the 
sample mean overall and 1% on the intensive margin although the estimates are imprecisely 
estimated. Most of the response of TRA 1986 was concentrated on the extensive margin.  
  This paper can be extended in several directions.  First, the nonparametric estimates 
obtained here can be used to get new measures of the deadweight loss arising from taxation of 
labor supply by using the nonparametric approach proposed in Hausman and Newey (1995).  
The identification strategy calls for more exogenous variation in the budget set of individuals.  
Extending the econometric strategy proposed here to panel data spanning several years will be a 
fruitful area of future research.
  There are many instances where economic behavior results in 
corner solutions.  These can only be modeled in a limited dependent variable framework. 
Examples include female labor supply, labor supply effects of social security earnings test, 
charitable contributions behavior, 401(k) contributions, and labor supply of the elderly.
47  The 
econometric strategy adopted here can be readily applied to these settings. 
                                                           
47 Nonlinear budget techniques have also been employed to analyze the following issues:  effect of tax deductibility 
on charitable contribution behavior (Rees and Zieshang (1995); disability applications (Hausman 1985); employer 
matching on saving behavior (Engelhardt and Kumar (2003)); water demand; capital gains taxation; and housing 
demand.  Nonlinear budget constraints can also arise in the private sector in case of goods which have a block-
pricing structure or quantity discounts. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
   Nonworking    Working     Overall   
             
  Mean  Std Dev  Median  Mean  Std Dev  Median  Mean  Std Dev  Median 
             
Hours  0.00  0.00  0.00  1616.65 592.05 1752.00  1140.25 889.21 1356.00 
             
Gross  Wage  7.38  2.44  6.97 7.98 4.70 7.00 7.81 4.18 7.00 
             
Marginal  Tax  Rate  33.23  10.38  34.62  35.73 5.97 34.75  35.00 7.63 34.70 
             
First-Dollar  Tax  Rate  11.65  11.52  7.10 8.71 8.37 4.10 9.58 9.50 4.10 
             
Adjusted Gross 
Income (‘000)  31.68  24.96  29.00 43.75 22.43 40.00 40.19 23.84 37.31 
             
Slope on the First 
Segment  4.88  1.71  4.59 5.35 3.25 4.62 5.21 2.89 4.61 
             
Slope on the Last 
Segment  4.55  1.71  4.12 5.11 2.97 4.35 4.94 2.67 4.26 
             
Virtual Income on the 
First Segment (‘000)  38.84  24.55  34.76 32.96 18.93 29.50 34.70 20.91 30.45 
             
Virtual Income on the 
Last Segment (‘000)  39.39  24.10  34.50 33.50 18.89 29.96 35.24 20.73 30.92 
             
Total Number of 
children  1.27  1.30  1.00 1.25 1.15 1.00 1.26 1.19 1.00 
             Family  Size  3.57  1.36  4.00 3.52 1.17 4.00 3.53 1.23 4.00 
             
Belongs to Union  0.02  0.12  0.00 0.13 0.33 0.00 0.09 0.29 0.00 
             
Owns  Home  0.84  0.36  1.00 0.85 0.36 1.00 0.85 0.36 1.00 
             
Age  42.59  10.96  41.00  39.14 9.10 38.00  40.16 9.81 38.00 
             
White  0.92  0.27  1.00 0.93 0.26 1.00 0.93 0.26 1.00 
             
Education  12.42  2.49  12.00  13.12 2.25 12.00  12.91 2.35 12.00 
             
Note: Nonparametrically predicted wages used as wages for nonworkers.  After-tax wage, virtual income, and assets are expressed in 1989 dollars. 
 
                               
 
  42Table 2: Estimated Elasticities from Censored Specification with Nonlinear Budget Set 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
        
Wage Effect  66.91  92.82  99.16  130.48  123.26 
  (16.22)  (15.32) (18.60) (19.78) (30.62) 
        
Wage  Elasticity  0.31  0.42 0.45 0.60 0.56 
  (0.07)  (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.14) 
        
Income  Effect  -17.65  -19.04 -19.08 -22.09 -23.49 
  (2.62)  (2.27) (2.98) (3.87) (5.42) 
        
Income  Elasticity  -0.54  -0.58 -0.58 -0.67 -0.71 
  (0.08)  (0.07) (0.09) (0.12) (0.17) 
        
Compensated  Elasticity  0.40  0.52 0.55 0.71 0.69 
  (0.08)  (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.15) 
        
Tax  change  effect  0.03  0.04 0.05 0.07 0.03 
P-value on bias correction 
term  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AIC  34567.62  34759.38 34275.21 34503.97 34406.47 
SBIC  34719.58  34927.79 34464.87 34720.98 34655.93 
Observations  1681.00  1690.00 1667.00 1678.00 1674.00 
R-squared  0.30  0.31 0.30 0.31 0.32 
Note: Dependent variable in all the regressions was annual hours of work. The results in this table are from estimating equation (21) in the text. This 
equation has four terms excluding the error term. The first term is the nonparametric labor supply function for a linear budget set and is modeled as a 
power series.  In column (1) the order of the power series is one, in column (2) the order is two and so on. See footnote 32  for further description. The 
second and third terms represent the bias due to budget set nonlinearity.  See footnote 33 for an explanation of how this term was modeled. The results 
in this table control for the bias terms. Other individual characteristics entered in the regression additively (i.e. the 4
th term) were number of children, a 
quartic in age, self reported health status. The results presented in the table are from Symmetrically Censored Least Square (SCLS) estimation (Powell, 
1985). Bootstrapped standard errors reported in parentheses are based on 99 replications. The wages for nonworkers were obtained from a 
nonparametric selection-corrected regression of wage on age and education by estimating equation (24). The elasticities are calculated at the sample 
mean of after-tax wage and virtual income on the first segment of $5.21 and $34,700 respectively and at mean annual hours of 1140. These means are 
over both workers and nonworkers. 
  43Table 3: Estimated Elasticities from Censored Specification with Linear Budget Set 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
        
Wage Effect  51.09  77.73  84.73  112.06  117.94 
  (12.47)  (12.33) (17.51) (16.37) (30.92) 
        
Wage  Elasticity  0.23  0.36 0.39 0.51 0.54 
  (0.06)  (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.14) 
        
Income  Effect  -11.36  -13.28 -13.96 -15.77 -19.23 
  (2.08)  (2.15) (2.66) (3.65) (4.31) 
        
Income  Elasticity  -0.35  -0.40 -0.42 -0.48 -0.59 
  (0.07)  (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.13) 
        
Compensated  Elasticity  0.29  0.42 0.46 0.59 0.64 
  (0.06)  (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.15) 
        
Tax change effect  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.05  0.05 
AIC  35451.24  35150.91 34660.89 34787.87 34669.29 
SBIC  35500.28  35216.22 34747.75 34901.96 34815.88 
Observations  1719.00  1706.00 1683.00 1690.00 1685.00 
R-squared  0.26  0.28 0.27 0.29 0.29 
Note: Dependent variable in all the regressions was annual hours of work. The results in this table are from estimating equation (21) in the text. This 
equation has four terms excluding the error term. The first term is the nonparametric labor supply function for a linear budget set and is modeled as a 
power series.  In column (1) the order of the power series is one, in column (2) the order is two and so on. See footnote 32 for further description. 
The second and third terms represent the bias due to budget set nonlinearity.  See footnote 33 for an explanation of how this term was modeled. The 
results in this table do not control for the bias terms. Other individual characteristics entered in the regression additively (i.e. the 4
th term) were 
number of children, a quartic in age, self reported health status. The results presented in the table are from Symmetrically Censored Least Square 
(SCLS) estimation (Powell, 1985). Bootstrapped standard errors reported in parentheses are based on 99 replications. The wages for nonworkers 
were obtained from a nonparametric selection-corrected regression of wage on age and education by estimating equation (24). The elasticities are 
calculated at the sample mean of after-tax wage and virtual income on the first segment of $5.21 and $34,700 respectively and at mean annual hours 
of 1140. These means are over both workers and nonworkers. 
  44Table 4: Selection Corrected Hours Elasticities Conditional on Working with Nonlinear Budget Set 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
        
Wage  Effect  54.11  67.95 82.54 84.53 88.19 
  (10.52)  (11.73) (11.53) (13.12) (21.02) 
        
Wage  Elasticity  0.18  0.22 0.27 0.28 0.29 
  (0.05  (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) 
        
Income  Effect  -5.41  -6.40 -7.70 -7.10 -7.50 
  (1.03  (1.27) (1.45) (2.18) (2.80) 
        
Income  Elasticity  -0.11  -0.13 -0.16 -0.14 -0.15 
  (0.03  (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) 
        
Compensated  Elasticity  0.21  0.26 0.31 0.32 0.33 
  (0.05  (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) 
        
Tax  change  effect  0.01  0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 
P-value on bias correction 
term  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
P-value on selection bias  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
AIC  24535.00  24531.89 24488.34 24493.41 24504.47 
SBIC  24698.91  24711.16 24688.10 24718.78 24760.58 
Observations  1239.00  1239.00 1239.00 1239.00 1239.00 
R-squared  0.13  0.14 0.17 0.17 0.18 
Note: Dependent variable in all the regressions was annual hours of work. The results in this table are from estimating equation (25) in the text. This equation has five 
terms excluding the error term. The first term is the nonparametric labor supply function for a linear budget set and is modeled as a power series.  In column (1) the order 
of the power series is one, in column (2) the order is two and so on. See footnote 32 for further description. The second and third terms represent the bias due to budget set 
nonlinearity.  See footnote 33 for an explanation of how this term was modeled. The results in this table control for the bias terms. The fourth term is the nonparametric 
analogue of the inverse mills ratio obtained from a first stage nonparametric labor force participation equation (22). Other individual characteristics entered in the 
regression additively (i.e. the5
th term) were number of children, a quartic in age, self reported health status. The results presented in the table are from nonparametric 
selection-corrected hours regression using power series, conditional on participation in the labor force. Bootstrapped standard errors reported in parentheses are based on 
99 replications. The elasticities are calculated at the sample mean of after-tax wage and virtual income on the first segment of $5.35 and $32,960 respectively and at mean 
annual hours of 1616, for working individuals. 
  45Table 5: Selection Corrected Hours Elasticities Conditional on Working with Linear Budget Set 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
        
Wage  Effect  30.87  55.75 74.17 85.27 86.12 
  (8.00)  (11.82) (11.34) (12.43) (18.28) 
        
Wage  Elasticity  0.10  0.18 0.25 0.28 0.29 
  (0.04)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) 
        
Income  Effect  -5.46  -6.60 -7.15 -6.79 -6.24 
  (0.90)  (1.09) (1.17) (1.93) (2.58) 
        
Income  Elasticity -0.11  -0.13 -0.15 -0.14 -0.13 
  (0.03)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) 
        
Compensated  Elasticity  0.13  0.22 0.28 0.32 0.32 
  (0.04)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) 
        
Tax  change  effect  0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
P-value on selection bias  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
AIC  24561.28  24539.18 24509.29 24497.01 24507.77 
SBIC  24627.87  24621.13 24611.73 24625.06 24666.55 
Observations  1239.00  1239.00 1239.00 1239.00 1239.00 
R-squared  0.08  0.10 0.13 0.15 0.15 
Note: Dependent variable in all the regressions was annual hours of work. The results in this table are from estimating equation (25) in the text. This equation has five 
terms excluding the error term. The first term is the nonparametric labor supply function for a linear budget set and is modeled as a power series.  In column (1) the 
order of the power series is one, in column (2) the order is two and so on. See footnote 32 for further description. The second and third terms represent the bias due to 
budget set nonlinearity.  See footnote 33 for an explanation of how this term was modeled. The results in this table do not control for the bias terms. The fourth term 
is the nonparametric analogue of the inverse mills ratio obtained from a first stage nonparametric labor force participation equation  (22). Other individual 
characteristics entered in the regression additively (i.e. the5
th term) were number of children, a quartic in age, self reported health status. The results presented in the 
table are from nonparametric selection-corrected hours regression using power series, conditional on participation in the labor force. Bootstrapped standard errors 
reported in parentheses are based on 99 replications. The elasticities are calculated at the sample mean of after-tax wage and virtual income on the first segment of 
$5.35 and $32,960 respectively and at mean annual hours of 1616, for working individuals. 
 
  46Table 6: Robustness of Censored Regression Results to Inclusion of other Controls 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
         
Wage  Effect  130.48  116.21 114.84 161.12 108.50 154.58 
  (23.93)  (24.77) (25.04) (23.75) (25.73) (24.19) 
         
Wage  Elasticity  0.60  0.53 0.52 0.74 0.50 0.70 
  (0.11)  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) 
         
Income  Effect  -22.09  -21.91 -21.59 -13.41 -21.36 -13.11 
  (4.02)  (3.78) (3.80) (2.79) (4.00) (2.74) 
         
Income  Elasticity  -0.67  -0.67 -0.66 -0.41 -0.65 -0.40 
  (0.13)  (0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.12) (0.09) 
         
Compensated  Elasticity  0.71  0.65 0.64 0.81 0.61 0.77 
  (0.11)  (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) 
         
Tax  change  effect  0.07  0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.59 
P-value  on  bias  correction  term  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AIC 34503.97  34545.43  34570.44 35547.02 34589.80 35740.98 
SBIC 34720.98  34773.37  34803.84 35820.36 35072.92 37233.73 
Observations  1678.00  1681.00 1682.00 1749.00 1683.00 1751.00 
R-squared  0.31  0.32 0.32 0.49 0.35 0.56 
Race  and  Union  Dummies  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Dummy  No  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation Fixed Effects  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State Fixed Effects  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Occupation and State Fixed Effects  No  No  No  No  No  Yes 
Note: Dependent variable in all the regressions was annual hours of work. The results in this table are from estimating equation (21) in the text. This 
equation has four terms excluding the error term. The first term is the nonparametric labor supply function for a linear budget set and is modeled as a 
power series. All columns present results for power series of order four. See footnote 32 for further description. The second and third terms represent 
the bias due to budget set nonlinearity.  See footnote 33 for an explanation of how this term was modeled. The results in this table control for the bias 
terms. In the baseline model, other individual characteristics entered in the regression additively (i.e. the 4
th term) were number of children, a quartic in 
age, self reported health status. Column (1) is for the baseline model. The results presented in the table are from Symmetrically Censored Least Square 
(SCLS) estimation (Powell, 1985). Bootstrapped standard errors reported in parentheses are based on 99 replications. The wages for nonworkers were 
obtained from a nonparametric selection-corrected regression of wage on age and education by estimating equation (24). The elasticities are calculated 
at the sample mean of after-tax wage and virtual income on the first segment of $5.21 and $34,700 respectively and at mean annual hours of 1140. 
These means are over both workers and nonworkers. 
 
  47 
Table 7: Robustness of Conditional Regression Results to Inclusion of other Controls 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
         
Wage  Effect  84.53  87.58 86.69 81.88 86.38 80.03 
  (12.35)  (12.36) (12.28) (13.29) (13.04) (14.23) 
         
Wage  Elasticity  0.28  0.29 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.26 
  (0.06)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
         
Income  Effect  -7.10  -7.00 -6.58 -6.63 -5.86 -7.56 
  (2.26)  (2.20) (2.21) (2.19) (2.49) (2.60) 
         
Income  Elasticity  -0.14  -0.14 -0.13 -0.14 -0.12 -0.15 
  (0.07)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
         
Compensated  Elasticity  0.32  0.33 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.31 
  (0.06)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
         
Tax  change  effect  0.02  0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
P-value  on  bias  correction  term  0.01  0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.05 
P-value  on  selection  bias  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AIC 24493.41  24470.92  24468.10 24398.90 24394.66 24585.92 
SBIC 24718.78  24706.50  24708.80 24634.44 24630.24 25958.20 
Observations  1239.00  1238.00 1238.00 1237.00 1238.00 1227.00 
R-squared  0.17  0.18 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.36 
Race  and  Union  Dummies  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Dummy  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation Fixed Effects  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State Fixed Effects  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Occupation and State Fixed Effects  No  No  No  No  No  Yes 
Note: Dependent variable in all the regressions was annual hours of work. The results in this table are from estimating equation (25) in the text. This equation has 
five terms excluding the error term. The first term is the nonparametric labor supply function for a linear budget set and is modeled as a power series.  All 
columns present results for power series of order four. See footnote 32 for further description. The second and third terms represent the bias due to budget set 
nonlinearity.  See footnote 33 for an explanation of how this term was modeled. The results in this table control for the bias terms. The fourth term is the 
nonparametric analogue of the inverse mills ratio obtained from a first stage nonparametric labor force participation equation (22). In the baseline model, other 
individual characteristics entered in the regression additively (i.e. the 5
th term) were number of children, a quartic in age, self reported health status. Column (1) is 
for the baseline model. The results presented in the table are from nonparametric selection-corrected hours regression using power series, conditional on 
participation in the labor force. Bootstrapped standard errors reported in parentheses are based on 99 replications. The elasticities are calculated at the sample 
mean of after-tax wage and virtual income on the first segment of $5.35 and $32,960 respectively and at mean annual hours of 1616, for working individuals. 
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  56Table A1 Sample Exclusions from PSID 1985 and PSID 1989 
 
Reason  Observations Excluded  Observations Remaining 
    
Total number of observations  0  38360 
    
Only wives   32025  6335 
    
SEO 2233  4102 
    
25>Age>60 1427  2675 
    
Head Self Employed  576  2099 
    
Self Employed  316  1783 
    
Missing Variables  12  1771 
  57Appendix 2 
Proof of Theorem 3.1:  
Suppose there are two segments.  Let the hours function be given by  
 
i i i i x h h ε η + = ) , (         (A.1) 
  
where  




i l l y y x ω ω ,     (A.2)   
is a vector  virtual incomes and slopes for  segments and  J J 1 − J  kinks.    
For example, in a world with two segments 
) , , , , ( 1 2 1 2 1 l y y x
v v
i ω ω =     (A.3) 
Write the desired hours function as 
) , , (
* η ω π
v
i y h =       (A.4) 
The desired hours function of the   individual on the  segment is given by  th i th j
) ( ) , , (
* η π η ω π j j
v
j ij y h = =      (A.5) 
Suppressing the individual subscript and without loss of generality assuming that the  budget set 
consists of two segments and one kink, the desired hours can expressed as: 
) 0 ( 0 ) (   if   0
1
1 1
* − ≤ ≤ −∞ ⇒ ≤ = π η η π h      (A.6) 
if individual does not work; 
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if the individual locates on the   of the first th j 1 − J  segments;   
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     (A.8) 
if the individual locates on the   of the  th j 1 − J  kinks; 
and 
) ) ( ) (   if   ) ( 1
1
1
* ∞ ≤ ≤ ⇒ ≤ = −
−
− η π η π η π J J J J J l l h      (A.9) 
if the individual locates on the   segment;  th J
For the probability density function  ) (η g of η, the expected value of desired hours can 
be written as
48

















































η η η π η η η η η π (A.10) 
                                                           
48 The proof presented here closely follows Blomquist and Newey (2002). (A.10 ) has been shown in Blomquist and 
Newey (2002). However, subsequently they assume that  0 ) 0 Pr( = = h , while this assumption is dropped here. 
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